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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS AND DELEGATION OF POWER.-With the
growth of American federalism and the passing of the doctrines of
laissez faire as axioms of economic and political legal theory, the Congressional function magnified. Throughout the last decade the multiphased problems of Congress has necessitated the creation of administrative commissions to perform-the policies of the legislature. Congress continues to declare the law and determine the legal principle to control
in given cases. In the same breath of legal creation it goes farther and
provides for an administrator or commission to vitiate the doctrine set-

NOTES
out. The transfusion of power from the national legislature to the administrator promotes sensitive Constitutional objection. Close followers
of the separation-of-powers doctrine forget that Montesquieu lived
in an era much less affected by a complex federalism than our present conditions present. Despite the conflict arising over the delegation
of legislative power, overwhelming authority will admit the delegation
of a ministerial function to an administrative group. This harmony
discords, however, when the question of statutory standards arises.
How much discretion may the established board enjoy? To what extent must they be kept on the puppet-strings of Congress? Recent decisions continue to reflect contrary opinion. From the conflict we may
make some conclusions.
The very nature of a delegation demands that the agency of Congress will employ some amount of discretion. As early as 1825 Chief
Justice Marshall stated that when Congress had decided the general'
principle of the measure, the administrative body might Constitutionally "fill in the details." This principle roots deeply in American Constitutional law.1 The Supreme Court has consistently intimated that
Congress must demarcate as completely as is practicable the limits of
the general rule it has laid down. Yet Congress has authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury "to establish standards" for the admission
of tea to this country; 2 it has delegated to the Inter-State Commerce
Commission the power "to designate rates and set the maximum variation and standard drawbars for freight cars"; 3 it has authorized the
same commission to require railroads to keep accounts in a manner
specified - not by the national legislature, but by the commission itself.4 Congress has even delegated the power "to make regulations" pertaining to the sale of oleomargarine. 5 In the creation of the Federal
Trade Commission, the Security Exchange Commision, the Federal
Communications Commission and a bevy of other bureaus Congress
delegated rate-making and regulatory power in terms of sweeping generality as the few instances above show. It must be remembered that a
subject of this type requires legislation for the regulation of future conduct. The objects of the delegation are obviously set-out in a declaration of policy but the particular grants of power are so diffuse and
1 Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23 U. S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 253 (1825); United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563 (1911); Hannibal
Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 31 S. Ct. 603, 55 L. Ed. 699 (1911);
Inter-State Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 32
S. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729 (1912); J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1928).
2 Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525 (1904).
8 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 28 S. Ct. 616,
52 L. Ed. 1061 (1908).
4

Inter-State Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S.

194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729 (1912).
5 In Re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 444,41 L. Ed. 813 (1897).
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variable that they can not be distinctly apprehended and comprised in
the ordinary terms of legislative classification. If Congress were to
classify a complete nomenclature of cases and events in which the
board should function, describe a course of action for each possible future event, the very purpose of the delegation would-be defeated before
the enactment was drawn.
In the decision of the now famous Schechter Poultry case,6 Chief
Justice Hughes stated: "Section thrde of the recovery act is without
precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct, it authorizes the
making of codes to prescribe them." Later in the opinion he continues
to say: "For that legislative undertaking section three sets up no
standards, aside from the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and
expansion." The 1935 high tribunal obviously took little notice of the
earlier chain of cases which held: "Standards may be laid down in
broad and general terms. If the legislature were required to specify
minutely and in detail the course to be pursued by the administrative
agency, there would be no advantage gained by the delegation"; 7 nor tothe previous holding that: "A discretion - broad or narrow as the
legislature shall deem expedient - may be vested in the delegate." S
In the early years of the Inter-State Commerce Commission the
delegation of the rate making power was often challenged on grounds
that it provided no standards. In 1913 Mr. Justice Hughes stated: "The
rate-making power necessarily implies a range of legislative discretion,
and so long as the legislative action is within the proper sphere, -the
Courts are not entitled to interpose and, upon their own investigation
of traffic problems and conditions,.to substitute their judgment for that
of the legislature or of the railroad commission exercising its delegated
powers." Subsequent tests of the constitutionality of the transportationgoverning commission have failed to disturb this expression of the
earlier court. The Federal Trade Commission has likewise been exposed
to this attack on standards and the discretion of the boards. Judge
Baker stated the accepted rule to this-group of cases when he ruled:
"The commissioners, representing the government as parens patriae,
are to exercise their common sense as informed by their knowledge of
the general idea of unfair trade at common law." 9 In this instance the
statute did not define the meaning of "unfair trade." Such neglect did
not, however, defeat its legality.
6 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. Ed.
1570, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
7 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 35
S. Ct. 387 (1915).
8 Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina, 222 U. S.
380, 32 S. Ct. 1'52 (1911).
9 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.-Fed. Trade Comm., 258 F. 307 (1919).

NOTES
The latest challenge of a legislative delegation of power on grounds
of "unfettered discretion" and failure of Congress to provide standards
is found in Roach v. Johnson.10 Federal District Judge Slick ruled *the
Emergency Price Control Act 11 unconstitutional on this ground. The
decision states: "Congress, under its War Powers, has authority to
regulate prices limited only by the Constitutional inhibition to provide
standards." Further along it states: "Again in the case at bar, as was
held in the Panama case,' 2 if it could be inferred that Congress intended
certain circumstances or conditions to govern the exercise of the authority conferred, the Administrator could not act validly without complying with the circumstances and conditions and findings by the Administrator that these conditions existed and were necessary, else it is left
entirely to the unfettered discretion of the Administrator." A close inspection of the Emergency Price Control Act leads one to believe that
this holding is not entirely founded. Section 902 of the statute states:
"So far as practicable, in establishing any maximum price, the Administrator shall ascertain and give due consideration to prices prevailing
between October 1st and October 15th, 1941 . . . and shall make ad-

justments for each relevant factor as he may determine." Admittedly
the statute permits the Administrator discretionary power to investigate
previous rentals and commodity prices, to peg both at the date specified
and to adjust equitably if the prices of October, 1941 are not generally
representative. How else could Congress provide for price fixing? No
two districts in the country have identical food, clothing and rental
values. By delegating a latitude of operation to the Administrator, the
purpose of the act - to prevent inflation by price stabilization, is affected intelligently. We have already seen that general terms stating
standards may provide for the power transfusion. Yet this case would
confine Congress to specific delegations within stated standards and defeat the expeditious purpose of this War necessity. It is interesting to
note that Judge Slick did not cite one of the many authoritative cases
providing that Congress "shall do no more than lay down the general
rules of action under which the Commission shall proceed," 13 nor was
the often cited Sears, Roebuck case 14 mentioned - a leading authority
for the contrary view which defends the constitutionality of the Federal
Trade Commission because Congress declared "the public policy applicable to the situation."
From the majority of cases we would surmise that Congress may
delegate legislative power - legislative in the sense of providing rates,
Roach v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 833 (1943).
11 U. S. C. A. Title 50, App. § 901.
10

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
Roach v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 833 (1943).
14 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 258 F. 307, 169 C. C. A.
323, 6 A. L. R. 358 (1919).
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rules and regulations for future conduct - to administrative bodies. In
the majority of cases general standards suffice as we have seen from
the creation of the Inter-State Commerce, Federal Trade and Federal
Communications Commissions. In other instances, the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Emergency Price Control Act being
typical, more specific statements by the legislature is necessary
'though questionably so. What the future of Administrative law will
be we can not predict. Perhaps our present Supreme Court will give
us a clue in the very near future when the rent-control case 15 stands
review.
William B. Lawless, Jr.

CONSTRUCTIvE TRUSTS ARISING OUT OF PURCHASES AT JUDICIAL

SALs.-While the English Statute of Frauds of 1676 required a writing
to create an express trust in real property, such statute has had no application in cases where the law raises a constructive trust by reason
of the fraudulent acts and purposes in procuring title to the land.' Constructive trusts have been held not to be within the statute of frauds
because they rest in the end on the doctrine of estoppel and the operation of an estoppel is never effected by the statute of frauds. 2
A common situation whereby such a (constructive) trust might
come into being, would be where A who had mortgaged land to C was
about to lose it through foreclosure proceedings. B, a relative of A,
came to A and represented to A that he would buy it at the sheriff's
sale and hold it for A's benefit,, offering also to give A a writing to this
effect and containing also permission for A to redeem it, but he baffled
A in relation to this writing and never gave it to him. By these circumstances A was prevented from raising money to purchase in the
land until it was too late for him to succeed in so doing, and B purchased at the sheriff's sale. It is generally held that B must be taken
to have purchased in trust for A. 3 For one purchasing land at a judicial
sale under an oral agreement to purchase for the benefit of another will
be decreed to hold the land for the benefit of the promisee where there
existed between them a confidential relation aside from that created by
the agreement to purchase, 4 or where the promisee supplied a part of
15
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1 Johnson v. Hayward, 74 Neb. 157; 103 N. W. 1058 (1905).
2 Parker v. Catron, 120 Ky. 145; 85 S: W. 740 (1905).
3 Dickson v. Stewart, 71 Neb. 424; 98 N. W. 1085; 111 Am. St. Rep. 596

(1904).
4 Strasner v. Carroll, 125 Ark. 34; 187 S. W. 1057; Ann. Cas. 1918E 306
(1916); Carter v. Gibson, 29 Neb. 324; 45 N. W. 634 (1890); Cutler v. Babcock,

81 Wis. 195; 51 N. W. 420 (1892).

